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This study has many different features just like the object with which it grapples – 
depression and its treatment. The study can be considered multiple yet singular in the same 
way depression can. It begins by exploring some of the current conceptualisations of 
depression and the differing theoretical perspectives held. From here, a brief historical 
sketch is laid out, examining some of the discontinuities in depression’s history, and 
highlighting the need to situate depression both socially and historically. The focus then 
shifts to the contemporary climate surrounding the treatment of depression and to Michel 
Foucault’s disciplinary techniques. These techniques are used as analytical tools and 
applied to four current treatments of depression: computerised cognitive behavioural 
therapy, guided self-help, cognitive behavioural therapy and behavioural activation. The 
analysis shows that in many ways these treatments do align with, and thus can be 
considered, disciplinary techniques. This increases the importance of considering issues of 
politics and power in relation to how people with depression are treated. However, this 
does not tell the full story; looking solely at disciplinary techniques does not capture the 
complexity of today’s treatments of depression. In attempting to adopt a conceptual 
approach that can speak to and complement clinical work, the notion of multiplicity is then 
discussed as a way of retaining the important insights of Foucault’s work but also attending 




From 1676 to 1825 the entrance to the London Royal Bethlem Hospital, infamously 
known as Bedlam, was guarded by two statues personifying madness: melancholy and 
raving (British Broadcasting Corporation, n.d.). These life-size, muscular, male 
representations of madness, sculpted by Caius Gabriel Cibber, show the two polar 
opposites of madness as conceptualised in pre-modern times.
1
 But, also, they imply 
treatments. Raving is enraged, needing to be bound in chains for his own safety, and, 
seemingly, for the safety of others. Melancholy needs no such chains and can be left to his 
own devices. He is distraught, his pain directed inwards, struck with grief and 
hopelessness. So we see two figures that are foreign yet at once familiar, and we are 
reminded of mental illness in our own age, with our own treatments, which are, perhaps, 
just as peculiar as those of the past.  
In the present day there is no mental illness with such ubiquity as depression – the 
object of this study. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), depression was 
the leading cause of disability in 2000, and is predicted to be the second highest contributor 
to the global burden of disease by 2020 (n.d., Depression).
2
 Depression is therefore viewed 
as a major global problem. Some talk of it as a “social and economic timebomb” (Dawson 
& Tylee, 2001, p. iii), others describe the current period as the “era of great depression” 
(Rousseau, 2000, p. 71). As a result, depression has become part of the vernacular, easily 
used without a definition, and seemingly self-evident. Given this, it would be reasonable to 
assume that depression is well understood, unanimously agreed upon, and stable and 
enduring. However, things are not quite so simple. 
 
Theoretical groundwork 
Before approaching depression as an object, it is necessary to do a bit of theoretical 
groundwork. Firstly, the process of considering depression in this way may unintentionally 
imply that depression can be known outside any social and historical context. While some 
may consider this reasonable, one of the central features of this study is that it is informed 
by, and aims to further evidence, the view that psychiatric objects, like depression, need to 
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be situated in order for them to be comprehensively understood. This requires attending to 
the theoretical positions underpinning conceptualisations of depression, and the, often 
competing, practical issues surrounding depression. As this study will show, depression 
has, at different points in time, been described, deployed and interacted with from a range 
of perspectives: psychiatric, psychological, medical, pharmacological, political, social 
constructionist, critical realist, and patient/sufferer amongst others. I will add to this by 
considering current treatments of depression in relation to Michel Foucault’s disciplinary 
techniques.  
There have, therefore, been many versions of depression which differ depending 
upon the specific field (psychiatric, social constructionist etc) and historical location from 
which they emerge – depression is a synchronically and diachronically shifting object. 
These differing positions are important, they are not mutually exclusive; instead, they 
overlap and interact depending upon each position’s power and influence. Yet our concept 
of depression seemingly remains coherent despite the complex web in which it is 
entangled. Rather than making an argument for one position over the others, I will attempt 
to capture the complexity of this situation by drawing upon Annemarie Mol’s (2002) 
elaboration of multiplicity in The Body Multiple. Here, Mol, influenced by Foucault 
amongst others, describes atherosclerosis as an object of multiplicity. In this context, Mol 
wants multiple to be understood as “manyfoldedness, but not pluralism. In the hospital the 
body (singular) is multiple (many)” (p. 84). The important point is that multiplicity is not 
fragmented, but held together. It is singular and multiple at the same time.  
I will revisit Mol’s analysis after considering depression, its treatment and 
Foucault’s disciplinary techniques in relation to these treatments. In so doing, I will 
attempt to show that multiplicity is a sophisticated way of engaging with depression and its 
treatment which has the potential to enhance both theoretical and clinical approaches. 
 
Depression as object 
A review of the two current leading sources for diagnostic criteria, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, henceforth DSM) and the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), 
shows that depression is far from straightforward.  
Firstly, within the DSM, the classification is not depression but the Depressive 
Disorders, of which there are three: Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder (a 
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long lasting but less severe form of Major Depressive Disorder) and Depressive Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified (American Psychiatric Association, henceforth APA, 2000).  
Major Depressive Disorder can be either a single episode or recurrent. It is 
diagnosed when a person experiences the presence of at least five symptoms from a 
maximum of nine, one of which must be diminished interest or pleasure. The symptoms 
must be present for at least two weeks and lead to an impairment in functioning. The nine 
symptoms are: depressed mood; diminished interest or pleasure in activities; significant 
change in weight or appetite; insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or 
retardation; fatigue or loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt; 
reduced ability to think, concentrate or make decisions; and, lastly, recurrent thoughts of 
death, suicidal ideation, attempts or plans (p. 356). This disorder is differentiated according 
to severity which is based upon the number of symptoms a person experiences, the severity 
of the symptoms, and the degree of impairment and distress (p. 412). Major depressive 
disorder, then, is a heterogeneous condition that affects sufferers in numerous ways.   
The ICD-10 criterion is similarly based upon the presence of a certain number of 
symptoms for a certain period of time. However, it does differ from the DSM in some 
areas. For instance, a diagnosis of mild depressive episode requires four symptoms as 
opposed to five in the DSM (WHO, 1992; APA, 2000). As evident from both the DSM and 
the ICD-10 criteria, and as stated in the latter, mood disorders are differentiated from one 
another and diagnosed based upon “clinical descriptions of emotions and behaviour” 
(WHO, 1992, p. 13).  
So depression is far from unitary and there is some disagreement between the two 
leading nomenclatures. An updated edition of the DSM is due for release in May 2013 
(APA, n.d.(a)). Mood disorders are due to be renamed depressive disorders. Also, a new 
disorder, Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder, is being proposed for inclusion, and Mixed 
Anxiety/Depression is being suggested as a condition for future research (APA, n.d.(b)). 
The former offers a reminder of the long-dominant association between womanhood and 
depression (see below); while the latter could be read as evidence of the timeliness of the 
recent Improving Access to Psychological Therapies programme established to treat 
depression and anxiety disorders within England (Clarke et al., 2009). On the other hand, it 
also echoes Healy’s (2004) work which provides examples of disorders being marketed in 
order to sell certain pharmacological treatments, rather than drugs being developed, and 
then marketed, to treat pre-existing disorders. These ongoing changes suggest that 
depression is, at least to some extent, in flux. 
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The view proposed by the DSM is not accepted by all. From a social constructionist 
perspective, depression is viewed as a problem at the societal level and not as a problem 
with the inner psychology of the individual (Burr, 2003). Or, put another way, “depression 
is not an individual disorder; an individual ‘does depression’ as a culturally intelligible 
action within a context of relationship” (Gergen, 1999, p. 137). This view advocates 
examining the discourses structuring people’s lives, the ways in which these may be 
unhelpful, and finding ways to resist or restructure oppressive discourses (Burr, 2003, pp. 
122-123).  
There are also those who view the reality of depression as being produced by the 
biomedical industry, in part due to the increase in diagnosis of depression paralleling the 
availability of pharmacological treatments (Borch-Jacobsen, 2009). As Healy (2001) 
explains, this position is further supported by the fact that anxiety disorders dominated 
primary care diagnoses until the 1980s when benzodiazepines, the leading treatment for 
anxiety at the time, became viewed as problematic for a number of reasons including fears 
of dependence. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which had recently been developed, 
were then marketed as antidepressants, although they could easily have been marketed as 
anxiolytics, leading to depression taking over anxiety’s position of dominance.
3
 From this 
view, a change in treatment would lead to a change in the condition. 
Alternatively, Pilgrim and Bentall (1999) offer a critical realist perspective on 
depression as a way of emphasising the cultural and historical relativity of emotional states 
while retaining the importance of empirical investigations of distress. This allows them to 
view depression as “a professional reification about human misery, not a fact” and to call 
for a review of depression conceptually to increase its scientific and clinical utility (p. 
271). One suggested way of reconceptualising depression is to both broaden and narrow its 
application; broadening depression allows a thorough engagement with socio-political 
contributors while narrowing it allows specific behaviours and experiences, such as 
anhedonia, that occur in particular contexts to be researched in more detail.  
 
A glance at the past 
This picture of depression remains incomplete. Recent work has shown that in 
order to understand psychiatric and psychological knowledge it is necessary to consider the 
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role of social and historical processes (Hacking, 1995 and Kusch, 1999 being two 
exemplars). That is, in order to reach a sophisticated understanding of something like 
depression, it is necessary to situate it – discursively and historically. This is a tall order 
when considering contemporary issues as certain concepts are more likely to be taken for 
granted than they would be in historical or cross-cultural research. Nevertheless, 
attempting to situate contemporary depression requires a consideration of its historical 
trajectory.  
 Turning to depression’s history we see a process of ongoing reconceptualisation, 
making the planned DSM modifications to depression appear as the rule rather than the 
exception. The actual word depression, before being used in psychiatric discourse, was 
used in physical medicine where it referred to reduced cardiovascular function. 
Psychiatrists adopted this word to refer to emotional states which opposed excitation 
(Bentall, 2003, pp. 213-214).  
As a disorder, depression emerged from the now antiquated melancholia.
4
 Given 
that melancholia can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, it would be easy to conceive of 
melancholia, and by extension depression, as a stable, enduring form of mental illness. 
However, this would be anachronistic and “only chronicle the history of the pertinent 
words” (Berrios, 1995, p. 384). This is because, from Antiquity to the Renaissance, 
melancholia was regarded as a severe, intellectual form of madness which incorporated 
delusions (Porter, 1995). Sadness and dejection were not necessary symptoms, despite 
occasional references to them (Berrios, 1988).  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept of melancholia was 
transformed via the influence of faculty psychology, the clinico-anatomical model and 
importance being granted to subjective experiences of madness (Berrios, 1995). 
Increasingly, melancholia was thought of primarily as an affective disorder. These changes 
created the conditions for Kraepelin’s concept of manic-depressive insanity in the 1920s 
(Berrios, 1995). This marked a significant point of departure from previous conceptions of 
melancholia. The dissolution of neurasthenia after the first-world war, which became 
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subsumed by the well-known shell-shock, was a further key factor in establishing the 
conditions for depression to flourish (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999).
5
 
Kraepelin’s manic-depressive insanity was one half of his proposed division of 
mental disorders into two main forms of illness, the other being dementia praecox. 
Kraepelin’s view that studying symptoms of mental diseases would enable the accurate 
discovery of disorders and their aetiology led to his concept of manic depressive insanity 
(Bentall, 2003). This was an overarching category of insanity which contained a variety of 
depressive states: melancholia simplex, stupor, melancholia gravis, paranoid melancholia, 
fantastic melancholia and delirious melancholia (Kraepelin, 1921). Kraepelin’s concept 
meant that patients could be differentiated according to prognosis and symptoms; the latter 
ranging from feeling tired through to terrifying hallucinations (Lawlor, 2012). His work 
was of such magnitude that “in Europe, every view on the affective disorders since 1896 
has defined itself with reference to him” (Healy, 1997, p. 37). And some view the 
emergence of two classes of psychotropic drugs in the 1950s, antipsychotics and 
antidepressants, as “the ultimate vindication of … [Kraepelin’s] point of view” (p. 37). 
However, Kraepelin’s ideas were not immediately embraced by all within 
psychiatry; in many ways, his views took a back seat during large parts of the twentieth 
century in relation to psychoanalysis – another of the major influences upon twentieth 
century psychiatry. This provides an important lesson in historical understanding. It is not 
the case that historical change simply represents progress, development or that we are 
getting closer to the truth or essence of depression.
6
 Rather, historical change is more the 
outcome of a complex web of power relations – in this instance between psychoanalytic 
and biological approaches to psychiatry. It is only retrospectively that the outcome can be 
viewed as having been inevitable. Forrester (1980), in one of his many studies of the 
history of psychoanalysis, makes an analogous point: “in history, as in psychoanalysis, one 
understands what comes before through what came after” (p. 212). 
Following the development of antidepressants, Kraepelin’s work became 
increasingly significant and the legacy of his work remains today (Healy, 1997). While 
aspects of his category of manic depressive insanity may seem foreign to modern eyes, the 
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influence of his method of developing disorders from clusters of symptoms can be clearly 
seen in the DSM criteria discussed above. Moreover, contemporary American psychiatry is 
dominated by a neo-Kraepelinian school of thought, further illustrating the substantial 
influence of Kraepelin’s ideas on contemporary understandings of depression and other 
psychiatric objects (Healy, 1997).  
Kraepelin’s emphasis on manic-depressive insanity being a form of illness also 
influenced subsequent distinctions between depressive neuroses and psychoses. He even 
pointed to psychogenic states of depression caused by environmental factors as distinct 
from manic-depressive insanity (Shorter, 2007). This distinction was reinforced, albeit 
from a contradictory perspective, through psychoanalysis. Freud’s admission that 
psychoanalysis may successfully treat neurosis but not psychosis “helped to suggest, at 
least in the public mind, a de facto distinction between depression, or neurosis indicated as 
a functional disorder, and psychosis…as organic” (Porter, 1995, p. 419). This division is 
peculiar to the West, with sufferers in Communist China representing their condition in 
physical terms, hence demonstrating “that which is psychiatrically thinkable in 
patient/doctor encounters is deeply mediated by cultural values” (p. 419).   
Psychoanalytic thought offered an alternative conceptualisation of depression 
which had a much greater immediate impact than Kraepelin’s ideas (Healy, 1997). Freud 
(1917) viewed melancholia as a form of loss characterised by feelings of dejection, loss of 
interest in the outside world, loss of the ability to love, a reduction in activity and an 
intense loss of self-regard. He attributed this to a psychic, rather than physical process – 
the unconscious transformation of anger towards a loved object into self-loathing.
7
 In the 
United States, Meyer also moved away from Kraepelin’s manic depressive insanity, 
criticising it for being too broad and overly focused on physical explanations difficult to 
prove (Lawlor, 2012). He had been arguing for melancholia to be replaced by depression 
since 1905, and viewed depression pragmatically as a reaction to a situation where 
something had gone wrong which could be treated both physically and psychologically.  
Ideas from Freud and Meyer dominated mainstream British and American 
psychiatric practice from the 1920s to the 1970s (Lawlor, 2012). This is made further 
apparent by the emphasis on loss and reaction in definitions of depression in the first two 
editions of the DSM (APA, 1952; APA, 1968). This was to change. By the time of the 
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release of the DSM-III in 1980, the influence of psychoanalysis, with its indifference to 
precise diagnosis, was in decline (Shorter, 2001). With the significance of psychoanalysis 
receding, the focus shifted to statistically analysing clusters of symptoms and, like 
Kraepelin, conceptualising depression as a unitary disorder.
8
 According to the DSM-III, 
depression is a disorder of the emotions characterised by dysphoric mood, and additional 
psychomotor and cognitive symptoms (APA, 1980). Although this view made it difficult to 
distinguish between normal and abnormal states of sadness, it increased the reliability – 
though not necessarily the validity – of diagnosis (Lawlor, 2012). 
The DSM-III criteria coincided with biological models of depression regaining the 
dominant theoretical position with research into the genetic basis of depression, 
neurotransmitters and the expansion of antidepressants as the leading treatment. Another 
influential view, despite differing vastly in emphasis, sought to complement not contradict 
this biological perspective. It views depression as a cognitive error characterised by 
exaggerated, negative views of the self, the world and the future (Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979). Accordingly, depression is not caused by events themselves but by the 
meaning individuals inaccurately place upon events, and it can be treated through 
suggesting alternative, realistic thoughts. This formed the basis for cognitive therapy, and, 
coupled with ideas from behaviourism, the more recent, and increasingly significant, 
cognitive behavioural therapy of today (Pilgrim, 2011). 
This desire to complement rather than contradict a biological perspective of 
depression is readily understood when one considers the enormous influence 
antidepressants have had in recent years. This cannot be understated; by 1994, fluoxetine, 
or prozac, was the second bestselling medication worldwide (Borch-Jacobsen, 2009). 
Given this, it is staggering to reflect on the fact that when the antidepressant effects of 
imipramine were first identified, the pharmaceutical company Geigy initially decided 
against financing further development of this drug as they believed the market would be 
too small. What has happened then, as Healy (1997) has documented, is that the dramatic 
increase in depression has paralleled the introduction and proliferation of antidepressant 
medication. This has led Healy to comment on how pharmaceutical companies not only 
“make drugs, but less obviously they make views of illnesses” (p. 181). One example he 
gives is how Merck, in order to market the drug amitryiptyline, marketed the actual 
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concept of depression through the distribution of 50,000 copies of a book on the subject of 
recognising and treating depression.  
While this kind of marketing alone is insufficient to explain the full extent of 
modern day depression, it seems reasonable to conclude, as Borch-Jacobsen (2009) does, 
that “depression is itself the product of antidepressants” (p. 203). Or, put more 
comprehensively:  
Given the many revisions of psychiatric nosology during the last thirty years, it is 
clearly a mistake to think that mental illnesses are something that have an 
established reality and that the role of a drug company is to find the key that fits a 
predetermined lock or the bullet that will hit an objective target. Although there are 
clearly psychobiological inputs to many psychiatric disorders, we are at present in a 
state where companies can not only seek to find the key to the lock but can dictate a 
great deal of the shape of the lock to which a key must fit (Healy, 1997, p. 212). 
Clearly, antidepressants have left an indelible mark upon today’s depression. 
It is also important to reflect upon the way in which gender has influenced 
conceptions of melancholia and depression. For instance, this study began by alluding to a 
highly gendered portrayal of melancholia – the two Bethlem statues – from a time when 
both mania and melancholia were traditionally viewed as male oriented (Porter, 1995). In 
fact, Rousseau (2000) has claimed that “the genderization of madness is historically more 
significant that its medicalisation….madness had been primarily a male province until the 
eighteenth century” (p. 82). While not considered mad, the female character was 
considered to be naturally depressive (in an anachronistic sense) within Europe before 
1800.  
It was during the eighteenth century that women gradually came to be represented 
as mad and men, as depressed (Rousseau, 2000).  Showalter (1987) has illustrated the 
former. She has shown how, since the Victorian era, insanity, including 
melancholia/depression, has been conceived of as naturally feminine both within 
psychiatric thought and within mainstream societal views, including the views of women 
themselves. This representation appears to remain: “Studies indicate that depressive 
episodes occur twice as frequently in women as in men” (APA, 2000, p. 354). The 
important point here is that depression has been intimately bound up with gender, and, at 
certain points in its past, can be considered a gender-specific malady. Raymond Prince 
(1967) has made a parallel observation regarding race; he has shown how, during the 
colonial era, European observers in Africa saw “very little melancholia or ‘true 
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depression’; [whereas] the independence-period observers see depressions [sic] much more 
frequently” (p. 184). This further highlights the malleability of depression as a concept. 
Even this brief consideration of depression and its history shows that it is not as 
well understood as one may originally think; it is highly contested rather than unanimously 
agreed upon, continuously renegotiated rather than set in stone, and relatively recent rather 
than age-old. How are we to make sense of this? 
The work of Ian Hacking (2007) offers one potential explanation to capture the 
continual reconceptualisation of depression. He describes how, through classification, the 
human sciences can bring into being new types of people. He calls this making up people 
(p. 285). There are five aspects involved in this process: the classification, the people 
classified, the institutions involved, the knowledge produced and the relevant experts. 
However, people interact with their classifications and, in doing so, alter the 
classifications. This is called the looping effect (p. 286) and it leads to the classifications 
becoming what Hacking calls moving targets (p. 293).
9
   
Returning briefly to antidepressants as an example, the view that depression has 
been produced by antidepressants becomes stronger with the benefit of Hacking’s 
framework. Antidepressants can be viewed as knowledge produced by experts within 
institutions, which are then given to the people classified who in turn interact with the 
knowledge, experts and institutions, and, thus, alter the classifications. Here, depression 
may become that which responds to antidepressant medication. In this sense, 
antidepressants are involved in the making up of depression.  
Multiplicity also has useful explanatory capabilities here. Instead of viewing the 
historical reflections presented as natural precursors to today’s depression, we see a 
multiplicity of depression throughout history. Each subsequent concept of depression is 
necessarily a renegotiation, influenced by the field and theoretical orientation it emerges 
from, of what has gone before. This entails viewing depression’s historical variation as the 
outcome of a complex network of power relations which continually reconstructs 
knowledge of depression, rather than being driven by ever-closer approximations to the 
truth of depression. 
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This brief historical review is unsatisfactory in many regards. It reduces the many 
nuanced and complex debates that have taken place regarding depression, and overlooks 
important social factors influencing depression. Clearly, these are extremely important for 
sophisticated understandings of this psychiatric object, but this would be a different project 
entirely. Historical reflections always involve a series of choices on the part of the author, 
both practical, such as the material to discuss, and theoretical.
10
 Moreover, they can never 
be disentangled from their own social and historical context. One theoretical choice is to 
emphasise continuity or discontinuity. Here, I have attempted to illustrate some of the 
discontinuities in the history of depression, of which there are many. My thinking here is 
influenced by Foucault’s work, particularly The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). 
Hopefully some of the historical issues presented above will be informative for present 
purposes, to which we now turn. 
 
Contemporary climate 
Deep within the Labour Party’s 2005 election-winning manifesto sat a rather vague 
commitment for continued investment in, and improvement of, mental health services (p. 
64). This vagueness was soon to materialise into the unprecedented Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme. IAPT was established to implement the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines for treating 
depression and anxiety disorders using psychological therapy (Clark et al., 2009). This was 
a considerable investment leading to an increase in government funding of £173 million 
per year, and requiring the training of at least 3,600 new therapists (Clark et al., 2009). 
 The Depression Report was a key document in making the case for the benefits of 
psychological therapy and thus the IAPT programme (Layard et al., 2006). This report 
describes “crippling depression and chronic anxiety” as “the biggest causes of misery in 
Britain today” (p. 1). The report, while keen to emphasise value in reducing suffering, is 
largely based on an economic argument:  
the total loss of output due to depression and chronic anxiety is some £12 billion a 
year…of this the cost to the taxpayer is some £7 billion….These billions of pounds 
lost through inactivity are a huge cost when compared with the £0.6 billion a year 
which a proper therapy service would cost (p. 5).     
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Viewing depression as “a major national problem” (p. 12), the report concludes asking 
readers to demand the implementation of the NICE guidelines from those in control of 
public expenditure. So, what is it, exactly, that readers should be demanding takes place?  
 
The NICE depression 
NICE have chosen to base their guidelines on the DSM criteria, largely because 
these criteria are employed in the majority of research (NICE, 2011, p. 17). The treatments 
within the guidelines are organised by type of intervention. The three main types are low-
intensity psychosocial interventions, high-intensity psychological interventions, and 
pharmacological and physical interventions.  
Low-intensity psychosocial interventions include computerised cognitive 
behavioural therapy – a form of cognitive behavioural therapy delivered using a computer 
which can be “the primary treatment intervention with minimal therapist involvement or as 
augmentation to a therapist-delivered programme” (p. 170); guided self-help – “a self-
administered intervention designed to treat depression, which makes use of a range of 
books or other self-help manuals” (p. 182), and is facilitated by a healthcare professional; 
and physical activity – “a structured physical activity with a recommended frequency, 
intensity and duration….it can be undertaken individually or in a group” (p. 191). These 
interventions are “for people with persistent subthreshold depressive symptoms or mild to 
moderate depression” (p. 213).  
High-intensity psychological interventions include cognitive behavioural therapy
11
 
– structured psychological therapy involving the identification and modification, via 
coping skills, of “problematic thoughts, beliefs and interpretations related to the target 
symptoms/problems” (p. 216); behavioural activation – a structured intervention designed 
to “reduce symptoms and problematic behaviours through behavioural tasks” (p. 239), 
such as reducing avoidance; and a range of other psychotherapies: couples therapy, 
interpersonal therapy, counselling, short term psychodynamic psychotherapy and rational 
emotive behavioural therapy. Cognitive behavioural therapy is preferred as it is said to 
have the largest evidence base (p. 291). These interventions are for those who have not 
benefited from low-intensity interventions and for those with moderate or severe 
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depression where the intervention should be combined with antidepressant medication (p. 
297). 
Pharmacological and physical interventions include a range of antidepressants: 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), tricyclic antidepressants and monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors (pp. 329-330), and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). If antidepressants 
are prescribed then SSRIs are typically preferred as they have a “favourable risk-benefit 
ratio” (p. 412), and ECT is recommended “for acute treatment of severe depression that is 
life-threatening and when a rapid response is required, or when other treatments have 
failed” (p. 526). 
The IAPT programme, then, assists in the provision of these low and high-intensity 
interventions (IAPT, n.d.), and so it is these that are being advocated with such enthusiasm. 
More recently, IAPT has continued to receive political support. The current government 
confirmed £70 million for IAPTs third year, and an additional £400 million for the years 
up to 2014/2015, with talking therapies becoming a key part of their mental health strategy 
(Department of Health, 2011).  
Clearly, IAPT has political importance then. This becomes even more apparent 
when considering the current political context – ostensibly characterised by austerity, 
localism and neo-liberalism. This raises the question of why IAPT is so politically 
appealing. Responses to this question could come from a variety of angles: it appears to be 
good economics, depression and anxiety are huge social problems, sufferers’ deserve 
treatment and so on.  
A more critical view may lead to questioning the social role of psychology, and 
other relevant disciplines.
12
 One such question: does the development of IAPT provide a 
smokescreen for other governmental policies that are wholly opposed to the aims of IAPT? 
An affirmative response to this question does rather portray psychology as a villain, albeit 
a naïve, perhaps well-meaning, one. Also, it tends to overlook what happens at the level of 
the individual. For, after all, even if psychology is a smokescreen, is that not because it is 
doing something generally perceived as worthwhile? Moreover, what does this view mean 
for the person desperately seeking some kind of support, finding it in the IAPT programme 
and utilising this support to make sought-after changes? Surely, it would be inaccurate to 
dismiss this as just a convenient distraction from larger political changes.  
                                                          
12
This line of critique has been pursued vigorously by some (see Parker (2007) especially). 
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These counter-questions quickly problematise viewing psychology as a mere 
political tool. And, even if this were a legitimate conclusion to reach, it does nothing to 
describe the relations between psychologist and patient, and the process by which these 
interactions serve wider political aims – surely an area worthy of attention in its own right.  
At this point the work of Michel Foucault becomes particularly pertinent.
13
 For 
Foucault’s work allows this question to be asked the other way around: instead of asking 
how psychology is used politically we can ask how politics operates psychologically – 
although not ahistorically – and it is this that brings us to power relations. This seems a 
more sophisticated way of approaching these recent developments, and Foucault’s work on 
disciplinary power in particular seems to offer useful analytic opportunities for attempting 
to understand this recent shift in the treatment of depression.  
 
Discipline 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) discussed the emergence of a new form 
of power which he called disciplinary power. Disciplinary power operates subtly through 
institutional mechanisms and techniques with individuals coming to introject these 
techniques to regulate their own behaviour.
14
 This form of power emerged when the system 
of rule shifted from the monarchical era of sovereignty to rule based upon the social body, 
a time when punishment was radically altered.  
Punishment went from being a violent, public spectacle on the tortured body of the 
criminal, to a more specialised form based on discipline and incarceration. Humanistic 
reform aided this development with crime no longer seen as an attack on the sovereign but 
on society. With this, punishment became the responsibility of the social body and this led 
to a focus upon individual correction which required knowledge of the criminal.  
Aspects of humanistic reform were incorporated into punishment which became 
focused on modifying behaviour through the specialist techniques of discipline: 
“Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards 
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Here I am thinking of Discipline and Punish first and foremost, but also his other work considering power such as 
Psychiatric Power. 
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The word introject, with its psychoanalytic connotations, is not ideal here as it is being applied to a period that 
predates psychoanalysis. However, internalise would equally be problematic due its psychological connotations; Foucault opted 
for inscribe – see quote below. This point is not insignificant according to Butler (1989): “In a sense, Discipline and Punish can 
be read as Foucault’s effort to reconceive Nietzsche’s doctrine of internalization as a language of inscription” (p. 605). 
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individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (p. 170). It produces docile 





Discipline, then, made individuals obedient and useful. It did this through a variety 
of techniques initially found in the military, schools, hospitals, factories and prisons. 
Foucault discussed the operation of discipline by isolating “four great techniques” (p. 167). 
The first of these was the drawing up of tables (pp. 141-149). This technique 
involved distributing individuals in space; sometimes a space closed in upon itself, but, 
more importantly, a space where each individual had a space and each space an individual. 
This allowed each individual to be known, assessed and judged, and also led to individuals 
being ranked in continuously changing positions. This technique had two important 
outcomes; it characterised the singular – the individual, and ordered the multiple – the 
group. 
The second was prescribing movements (pp. 149-156). This technique controlled 
activities through the use of timetables. These timetables established routines, imposed 
tasks and regulated repetition. They were as detailed as possible and only contained 
worthwhile activities. This, of course, required supervision. For some tasks, particularly in 
the military, instructions were provided on where parts of the body should be at given 
moments, or how objects should be interacted with. This technique was not just a way of 
avoiding wasted time, but of striving to use time in an increasingly productive way.  
The third technique was imposing exercise (pp. 156-162). Here, time was 
capitalised upon in specific ways. It was added up and divided into certain periods with 
each period having a specific end point. The tasks completed during each period increased 
in complexity and culminated with an examination. So the way in which exercise was 
employed was in an accumulative, graduated manner. Exercise, in this form, necessitated 
growth, observation and qualification.  
The final technique discussed was the arranging of tactics (pp. 162-167). This was 
said to be the highest form of disciplinary practice, the calculated combination of a variety 
of forces. Here, individuals became elements placed in relation to others, and viewed as 
part of a bigger machine. Consequently, it was thought that something could be extracted 
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In the past few decades, aided by Foucault and others, historians have focused on the body as a topic of research in 
its own right. See Crozier (2010) for example. 
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from individuals at all times. This was achieved through the creation of signals to which, 
once perceived, an individual responded immediately and appropriately.  
 
Disciplinary instruments 
In addition to these techniques, Foucault identified three major instruments of 
discipline: hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examinations.  
Discipline relied upon surveillance and hierarchical observation was to provide this. 
Surveillance, in an idealized form, would allow a single gaze to see everything at all times, 
but it was a system based upon integrated hierarchies of observation which proved most 
efficient. This established a network of relations with power produced more as a result of 
the particularities of the system than due to the individuals within it. Even supervisors were 
perpetually supervised and so potentially expendable.  
Normalising judgement involved making even minor deviations from the desired 
behaviour subject to some form of punishment. This meant that failing to achieve an 
expected level on a task could be considered worthy of punishing, with the appropriate 
punishment for this kind of offence being exercise and further training. This led to a 
situation where “rank in itself serves as a reward or punishment” (p. 181). As a result, 
deviating from normality became a new form of punishment within disciplinary power.  
   The examination combines both the hierarchical observation and the normalising 
judgement and is of central importance in the techniques of discipline. It is through the 
examination that power holds subjects “in a mechanism of objectification” (p. 187).  With 
the examination, there was a reversal in the relations of the documentation of individual 
lives; the object of writing became the child, the patient, the madman and the prisoner 
instead of, as previously, the king and the hero. This is what Foucault calls “the reversal of 
the political axis of individualization” (p. 192), and it was this that enabled the growth of 
the sciences of man. The examination provides each individual with a unique individuality 
and so here the productive aspects of power can be seen; power “produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production” (p. 194).   
Foucault illustrates the ideal form of disciplinary power through the architectural 
arrangements of Bentham’s Panopticon (pp. 195-228). Here, individuals, or subjects as 
Foucault prefers, were knowingly exposed to conditions of permanent surveillance, 
without being able to see their observers. Subjects could be carefully observed and 
compared at all times and so the Panopticon had a dual-purpose: experimentation and 
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observation. The efficiency of this technology was such that:  
He [sic] who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously 
plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (pp. 202-203). 
The Panopticon embodied a form of power that was exercised by the social body as a 
whole. It could be democratically controlled with members of the public visiting the 
Panopticon to observe both the observed subjects and the observers themselves. These 
mechanisms of discipline extended throughout the social body infiltrating all other forms 
of power thereby creating a “disciplinary society” (p. 216). 
The rationality underlying discipline, with its need to know the individual, opened 
up a space for the specialist study of humans, and, thus, shows the interlinking of power 
with knowledge – an important aspect of Foucault’s thought. One implication of this is that 
the human sciences have at their foundation particular power relations which the modern 
individual we know today – a product of the knowledge of the human sciences – has 
emerged from. This partly explains Foucault’s discomfort in utilising psychological 
discourse to discuss relations occurring before the advent of psychology.  
 
Aims 
As intoxicating as Foucault’s portrayal of disciplinary power is, at least to those 
inclined to his methodological preferences, it can be rather easy to generalise. Foucault 
argued that the human sciences were institutions involved in the production of disciplinary 
power, and his linking of power-knowledge makes this hard to refute. Accepting this, 
however, it is easy to develop a univocal position towards these disciplines and thus to turn 
away from the minutiae of the disciplines’ specific practices,
16
 already certain that they are 
merely extending unjust power relations. What I intend to do here is to turn towards these 
specific practices, to analyse the legitimacy of disciplinary power conceptually when 
applied to a particular practice – the treatment of depression. 
The main aims of this study, then, are twofold: firstly, to investigate the extent to 
which treatments of depression can be considered contemporary forms of discipline, and, 
secondly, to analyse the utility of discipline as a concept for thinking about specific aspects 
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This is not to say that this is what Foucault was advocating, as he does emphasise the heterogeneity and multiplicity 
of these various technologies, but more a potential response to his ideas. 
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of the human sciences. This research begins from the position that treatments of depression 
are not simply clinical decisions, but involve a range of social, political, institutional and 
historical factors, and, thus, need to be engaged with from a variety of angles and 
perspectives. It is one such angle that will be adopted here with the aim of being able to 
speak to and complement, rather than contradict and antagonise, clinical work. 
 
Analysis 
As described above, there are a wide range of potential treatments available within 
the NICE guidelines. However, due to space requirements, only four of these treatments 
will be analysed here. These treatments will be from the low intensity and high intensity 
sections of the guidelines and are therefore interventions that the well supported IAPT 
programme provides. Two of the low intensity treatments and two of the high intensity 
treatments will be analysed: computerised cognitive behavioural therapy, guided self help, 
cognitive behavioural therapy and behavioural activation. Each treatment will be 
considered in relation to the four great techniques discussed above, and, following this, 
these treatments will be considered collectively in relation to the instruments of discipline. 
 
Computerised cognitive behavioural therapy  
Computerised cognitive behavioural therapy (CCBT) is a structured form of 
treatment that follows the same principles as CBT. It is accessed via a computer 
programme and thus input required from professionals typically involves introducing the 
programme, brief monitoring and being accessible to the user. A programme called 
Beating the Blues is identified by the NICE guidelines as a suitable treatment (p. 180).  
A study by Proudfoot et al. (2004) describes the format of Beating the Blues. It 
consists of a 15 minute introductory video and then eight weekly sessions of therapy. The 
sessions last around 50 minutes and provide work to complete between sessions. These 
sessions are “customised to the patient’s specific needs and each session builds on the one 
before” (p. 46). The programme provides a report of the patient’s progress for the patient 
and the GP at the end of each session, including whether suicidal ideation is present. The 
programme contains cognitive components, such as challenging unhelpful thinking, and 
behavioural components, such as activity scheduling. 
In terms of the first technique, the drawing up of tables, it can be seen that CCBT 
distributes individuals in space in a particular way. This is an activity that positions each 
individual in front of a computer. This is paradoxical in its effect. Placed alone, in front of 
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a computer, this activity seems in many ways private with subjects being able to think and 
work at their own pace. Yet data is simultaneously collected by the programme and 
progress reports are printed for GPs so it is ultimately not a private activity but an observed 
one. It is also not the case that each space has an individual. In fact, computers can be, and 
often are, shared spaces. But, thinking of space at a more minute level, as a space on the 
programme rather than physical space, each individual does have a unique space and vice 
versa. The progress reports also allow ranking of individuals, and the efficient data 
collection provides each subject with a unique individuality, their report information, while 
continuously expanding and contracting knowledge of the group as a whole. 
The second technique, prescribing movements, can also be mapped onto CCBT in 
some ways. Firstly, CCBT provides individuals with a weekly therapy session and tasks to 
complete between each session. This entails an element of routine and the imposition of 
tasks. Some components of CCBT may extend this further. For example, activity 
scheduling, mentioned above, can be viewed in some ways as a timetable, and can 
certainly cover the entirety of a person’s time. However, this treatment lacks control over 
the implementation of this. For example, subjects weekly sessions of CCBT can be 
monitored to see if they are attending, but supervision of tasks outside of this time rely 
upon the cooperation and consent of subjects. At face value then, this seems to imply 
greater autonomy to subjects than the prescription of movements Foucault had in mind.   
The third technique, imposing exercise, also has some resonance with CCBT. The 
treatment lasts eight weeks and is divided into weekly sessions. As each session builds 
upon the previous session, this form of exercise occurs in a graduated fashion. This entails 
subjects to progress through the programme improving at the tasks as they go along. 
However, there is no mention of a final examination, only the same report that is generated 
at the end of each individual session. Nevertheless, it can be seen that CCBT does in some 
ways imitate modular educational training courses. 
Foucault’s final technique, the arranging of tactics, is less immediately applicable 
to CCBT. While individuals can be placed in relation to each other through the reports 
generated by these programmes, it is hard to see what is being extracted from them other 
than information, which recalls the power-knowledge dichotomy. Perhaps, though, this is a 
remedy to restore these subjects to a state where they are able to produce something of 
social use, which The Depression Report certainly seems to imply. Be that as it may, this 





Guided self-help is a form of treatment that individuals administer to themselves 
through the use of books and manuals. It is introduced, monitored and reviewed by a 
healthcare professional and involves between three and six contacts (p. 182). No specific 
resources are recommended within the NICE guidelines. As a result, I have selected a self-
help guide co-authored by one of the key figures in developing the IAPT curriculums 
(Richards & Whyte, 2009).  
This self-help guide is split into four sections: understanding the way you feel, 
finding out about depression and low mood, ways to improve your mood and staying well 
(Lovell & Richards, 2011). Users are encouraged to read the first two sections, make 
choices in the third section and use the final section when feeling better. People are 
expected to use this guide while receiving support from a “self-help coach” (p. 8), their GP, 
and friends and family. The advice given includes keeping written records, making a step 
by step plan of recovery, doing something every day, regularly talking to people about how 
things are going, and trying different ideas from the guide if particular ones are not 
working. Users are recommended to set themselves goals and the guide provides a list of 
things to do and to avoid in the areas of sleep, diet, irritability, energy and concentration 
levels. The guide, like CCBT, provides two main techniques for changing the way a person 
feels. The first, behavioural activation, focuses on establishing daily routines and 
increasing pleasurable activities. The second, cognitive restructuring, focuses on noticing 
and challenging unhelpful thoughts.  
Guided self-help, in many ways, seems inconsistent with the drawing up of tables. 
There is no additional space for individuals to enter or be placed within and no space 
waiting for individuals. The guided part of the self-help can take place over the telephone, 
via email, or face-to-face, but, apart from that, this treatment takes place in the space in 
which subjects reside on a daily basis. Despite this, the treatment does allow each 
individual to be known, assessed and judged. This is done through their own regular 
communications of their progress and through the worksheets contained within the self-
help guide. If this is the function of this technique it is achieved with little spatial 
modification. Furthermore, there is an individualising effect in that each subject selects 
their own goals and tasks.  
Prescribing movements is more easily identifiable. The guide encourages, but does 
not compel, individuals to do something every day. This is not as detailed as the level of 
movement prescription Foucault identified but is reminiscent of it.  Behavioural activation 
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clearly establishes routine and regulates repetition to some degree; this will be explored in 
more detail below. The cognitive restructuring task makes use of a thought diary to collect 
and record thoughts. In addition to recording thoughts, individuals are required to write 
down the situation they were in at the time of the thought, the associated emotion(s), to rate 
how bad the thought was, and, how much the thought is believed to be true, both from 0-
100%. Following this, individuals are to “collect evidence” for their thought, giving the 
thought a “fair trial”, and once completed to reconsider the truth of the initial thought (p. 
38). The focus on rationality is immediately evident here, as is the intimate and detailed 
nature of this task. Supervision is emphasised as preferable here too. Foucault’s second 
technique does not adequately capture what is going on here. Rather than prescribing 
movements, this task is prescribing mental activity in a detailed and restricted way. This is 
an operation less on the body and more on the thoughts of the individual instead. 
In terms of imposing exercise, guided self-help is similar to CCBT. Three to six 
contacts are recommended and so treatment time is divided up with a specific end point. 
The two individual techniques of behavioural activation and cognitive restructuring are 
graduated and the layout of the guide progresses in a way that implies growth with the final 
section being dedicated to ways of staying well. The idea of goal setting is also relevant 
here. Although it does not lead to a formal examination, it can be viewed as a way of 
imposing exercise and testing oneself. As a technique this seems in some ways more 
effective than Foucault’s version. The examination is not imposed upon a subject but is 
collaboratively agreed upon by the self-help coach and the subject. This requires a more 
active participatory role for the subject and thus potentially less resistance. As does the 
recommendation that individuals’ complete a mood questionnaire if they begin to feel low 
in mood again. These strategies place greater emphasis on subjects acting on their own 
volition than Foucault’s techniques. 
Not mentioned yet, but relevant here, the self-help guide contains “recovery 
stories” documenting the ways in which the self-help techniques have improved aspects of 
people’s lives (pp. 44-64). This resembles the arranging of tactics. Those using the guide 
can place themselves in relation to these recovered individuals. They can see the impact 
depression has had on a range of other people, and view themselves as part of a group of 
people affected by depression, albeit in unique, individual ways. Also, these recovery 
stories show ways in which individuals began to meet their goals. These included a woman 
taking her son to the park twice a week, another woman joining a night class, and a man 
feeling confident enough to meet his old colleagues. Thus, in some senses, and in line with 
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this technique, these individuals have become productive, or docile, again. The importance 
stressed upon ongoing monitoring of mood can also be viewed as the creation of signals, 
which, when perceived, leads to individuals re-initiating these techniques. 
 
Cognitive behavioural therapy 
 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is an educational form of therapy where 
people learn to recognise and revise unhelpful thinking styles and behaviours. It attempts 
to address any problematic beliefs underlying the presenting issues, and requires patients to 
practice what they have learnt in therapy in between sessions. In CBT, patients work 
collaboratively with therapists with the aim of being able to identify, monitor and 
counteract problematic thoughts, beliefs, feelings and other problem areas. This is typically 
done over 16 to 20 treatment sessions and most of the studies informing the NICE 
guidelines were based on the work of Beck et al. (1979). 
 The contemporary treatment for depression following the Beck model begins 
with the therapist assessing the patient, familiarising the patient with the cognitive model 
and dealing with the patient’s pessimism (DeRubeis, Webb, Tang & Beck, 2010). The 
patients’ level of depression is assessed in each weekly session to monitor any changes a 
patient makes during therapy. Patients are asked to read about the cognitive model of 
depression and to discuss their reactions to this with their therapist. Tasks are completed 
that patients have not been able to complete independently, and patients’ expectations 
towards task performance are discussed and monitored. As therapy progresses, patients are 
asked to identify situations and thoughts that lead to them feeling depressed. This is 
typically done using a Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts where patients begin to 
question their thoughts during or following a negative emotional experience. The therapist 
supports this process by reviewing the daily record in sessions. This is further 
supplemented by exploring patients’ idiosyncratic assumptions in interpreting events 
within their lives. Towards the end of CBT, progress is reviewed and the focus moves 
towards preventing relapse. Future potentially difficult situations are discussed to 
consolidate patients’ coping skills, and ending therapy is discussed with increasing 
responsibility for the treatment being given to patients. Follow up sessions, ranging from 
once per month to three times per year, are also arranged to prevent relapse.        
In relation to drawing up tables, the key space that this treatment uses is the 
therapists consulting room. This is a space that is used not for a single individual but for a 
potentially never-ending queue of subjects. This is not the same as Foucault’s drawing up 
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of tables. A relevant feature of CBT is that each individual is linked to an individual 
therapist. In Foucauldian terms, each subject has a master. This is more reminiscent of 
Foucault’s (1978) later work discussing the confessional than the disciplinary techniques 
described above. Although Hook (2007) describes the confessional as a disciplinary 
instrument in the verbal mode rather that the visual mode, which involves an additional 
element of speaking subjects turning themselves into discourse and thus constructing 
themselves through “given norms of identity” (p. 36). These surface differences between 
CBT and the drawing up of tables may be relatively unimportant if they both have the 
same outcome: each individual is definitely known, assessed and judged. There is also an 
individualising effect here, which is encouraged in the desire for subjects to take 
responsibility for their own treatment. The desire to make individuals into their own 
therapists closely relates to Foucault’s chilling description of the ideal form of disciplinary 
power. In this situation, subjects would be playing both power roles and becoming the 
principle of their own subjection.  
Movements are prescribed within CBT. There is the obvious routine of weekly 
therapy for 16-20 weeks. In addition, there are tasks to be completed between sessions: the 
most significant of these being the Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts. This is a more 
intimate activity than the military tasks Foucault described. For therapy to be deemed 
successful, subjects are required to attend closely to their emotions and accompanying 
thoughts, and to record them accurately and obediently for the therapist to scrutinise. 
Again, this recalls the confessional. Extending Foucault’s technique, the most important 
objects interacted with here are individuals’ thoughts which should be dealt with in 
particular ways. Prescribing movements encourages individuals to use time in an 
increasingly productive way and CBT teaches people to spend a great deal of time 
reflecting on their own thoughts. From the perspective of discipline, this can be viewed as 
a useful way of rendering individuals docile and achieving a situation where they come to 
regulate not only their own behaviour but their own thoughts too. This pushes Foucault’s 
discipline to another level. Operating first and foremost on the thoughts of individuals, as 
opposed to the body, if this distinction can be made, is surely a more insidious and 
effective strategy.  
CBT imposes exercise in well-defined ways. A 16-20 week block is divided into 
equal periods with one session in each. Between sessions, individuals have work to 
complete on a daily basis. Each session contains a form of examination – an assessment of 
any change in mood.  In accordance with its educational style, CBT operates in a graduated 
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manner. At the start of therapy, individuals are socialised to the CBT model and style of 
thinking and towards the end of therapy are expected to be starting to take responsibility 
for the treatment themselves. This therefore necessitates growth, observation and some 
form of qualification. More than this, it necessitates an ongoing self-observation. The end 
of therapy is more flexible and ambiguous than a simple examination. Rather, additional 
sessions of therapy can be arranged based upon the needs of each individual. So, deviation 
from Foucault’s technique is again evident.  
In terms of arranging tactics, CBT definitely creates signals for individuals to 
perceive and respond to. These signals are the emotions and thoughts of individuals. As 
described above, subjects are taught to recognise and challenge thoughts that are linked to 
negative emotions as soon as possible. CBT is also based upon a particular conception of 
what it is to be human and what humans are. That is, humans are cognitive beings whose 
behaviours, thoughts and emotions are closely interrelated and amenable to change. Also, 
negative emotion is not to be tolerated and to be extinguished via a form of rationality that 
critiques negative thoughts. Here, subjects exposed to CBT are all these types of beings, 
and are individual elements within a bigger machine. So, CBT can be viewed as a form of 
disciplinary practice based on this technique. 
 
Behavioural activation 
 Behavioural activation is one of the techniques contained within the self-help 
guide and a version of this, activity scheduling, is part of the CCBT programme. It will be 
discussed in more detail here as it is a recommended high-intensity intervention in the 
NICE guidelines. Behavioural activation is based upon the idea that depression results 
from a lack of positive reinforcement and is maintained through negative reinforcement. 
This intervention seeks to remedy the situation by breaking patterns of negative 
reinforcement, increasing pleasurable activities, and increasing task-focused behaviours. 
 One of the studies informing the recommendation of behavioural activation as a 
treatment for depression within the NICE guidelines will be considered here. It describes 
the steps involved in the implementation of this intervention (Hopko, Lejuez, Lepage, 
Hopko, & McNeil, 2003). Firstly, information is gathered about the function the depressed 
behaviour is serving, rapport is established with the patient, and the treatment rationale is 
introduced. Then: 
an activity hierarchy is constructed in which up to 15 activities are rated ranging 
from easiest to most difficult to accomplish. Using a master activity log…and 
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behavioral [sic] checkout to monitor progress (similar to the master log but kept in 
the presence of the patient to enhance accountability and compliance), the patient 
moves through the hierarchy in a systematic fashion, progressing from the easiest 
through the most difficult behaviors. At the start of each session, the behavioral 
checkout form is examined and discussed, with the following daily goals being 
established as a function of patient success or difficulty (2003, pp. 461-462). 
In this study, patients had three 20 minute sessions per week with clinicians to assess their 
progress and make any necessary modifications. The treatment lasted for two weeks.  
The drawing up of tables can be seen with this treatment, although in a slightly 
different form to the one Foucault articulated. There is the space of the clinic where the 
patient has sessions with the clinician. This is a space that is more flexible than being 
reserved for one individual though. Also, the spatial effects of this intervention seem 
infinite in possibilities. There are 15 activities selected and these activities are not 
predetermined but chosen together between patient and clinician. Thus, two individuals 
receiving this treatment may never experience it in exactly the same way. The 
individualising effects of this are clear, but the spatial requirements are fluid and 
potentially limitless. Despite this, each individual can still be known, assessed and judged 
so the outcomes of this treatment and Foucault’s technique may well still be the same. 
This treatment, of all those considered, must surely be the most similar to 
prescribing movements. It fits this technique almost entirely. It establishes routines, 
imposes tasks and regulates repetition. In the timetable example provided in the above 
study, tasks are as short as 10 or 20 minutes in duration so this treatment has the potential 
to be extremely detailed. The activities are also to be pleasurable and task focused and so 
time is being used in productive ways, although productive for the individual rather than 
the clinician. The treatment is also well supervised meeting a further criterion of the 
prescribing movements technique. If there is an area where this treatment differs from 
Foucault’s technique then it must be in the subject’s involvement. Although the treatment 
strives for compliance, it also requires rapport to be established. This shows that the 
subject takes an active role in this treatment, which was not the case in Foucault’s 
description.  
Behavioural activation also resonates with imposing exercise. The treatment divides 
time in particular ways. There is the time that is used for activities, and then the important, 
regular reviews of patients’ progress. The treatment is also relatively short in duration, two 
weeks in this instance, so the different periods of this treatment are clearly defined. 
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Furthermore, the tasks are to be completed in an obviously graduated manner. Growth is a 
consequence of this treatment as tasks are rated according to level of difficulty; an 
individual begins with the easiest tasks and gradually progresses to the most difficult tasks. 
There is also a form of examination as at the beginning and end of the treatment 
individuals depressive symptoms are assessed. Of course, this is not a test of how well 
individuals perform the activities, as it was in Foucault’s imposing exercise, but it is, 
nonetheless, a form of examination.  
The arranging of tactics fits this treatment less obviously. The master activity log 
can be viewed as a signal for individuals to respond to, and the attempt to extract 
something from individuals at all times is present. But it is not necessarily something that 
has any immediately tangible benefits to the clinician. After all, what does a clinician gain 
if an individual goes for a walk or gets out of bed? However, it would be a mistake to think 
that the lack of immediate benefits to the clinician means there are none whatsoever. 
Conformity is sought after, and ultimately necessary, for the perceived success and 
continued influence of this intervention. It may be that the clinician’s profession, and 
therefore the bigger machine of IATP, benefits from individuals’ compliance with 
behavioural activation in that it shows the value of the profession. And, it may have the 
eventual outcome of rendering a subject fit to contribute to society once more.  
 
Disciplinary instruments 
 It is clear that these treatments also relate to the instruments of discipline – 
hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and the examination – in numerous ways.
 Hierarchical observation is built into all of these treatments. The first level of 
observation occurs at the level of subjects themselves though, something not specified by 
Foucault. In fact, this seems to be one of the key differences between these treatments and 
Foucault’s techniques. All these treatments require the recipients’ to observe themselves. 
Beyond this, there is a hierarchy of observation – a self-help coach, a GP, a therapist, and 
further up the chain, the supervisors of these professionals. Power operates here through 
this dispersed network, through this set of arrangements that does not necessarily require 
any of the individuals within it to operate, but just the structure of the system itself. But, 
this is just in the abstract, as a system devised on a blank piece of paper. When you add 
individuals into this system, it will not remain a static machine but will be pulled in 
different directions by the individuals interacting with it – something that Hacking’s ideas, 
discussed earlier, capture.  
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 The normalising judgement is also identifiable within these treatments. The 
distinction between low and high-intensity treatments reflects this as these are designed for 
people with different levels of depression. So, from this angle, we can say that these 
treatments are punishments for severity of depression. For example, as the NICE 
guidelines specify, failing to respond to a low-intensity treatment makes someone 
appropriate for a high-intensity treatment. Being in treatment equates to deviating from 
normality and this reinforces the long-standing binary of normal/abnormal. Nowhere is the 
distinction between normal and abnormal more noticeable than in the DSM, which informs 
the NICE guidelines. A diagnosis from this manual can be considered the ultimate form of 
punishment from the perspective of the normalising judgement. 
The examination, too, features within these contemporary treatments of depression. 
This is in fact a central component of these treatments as it allows individuals to be 
differentiated from one another, the severity of their depression to be known, and their 
response to treatment to be monitored. The individualising effects, as discussed 
throughout, are clearly taking place as is the growth of knowledge of the individual. The 
examination in this context though is not an examination of individuals’ abilities, but of 
their mood, giving an increasingly detailed knowledge of the depressed individual. 
 
Where does this leave us? 
At this point, it seems reasonable to conclude that contemporary treatments of 
depression can be considered disciplinary techniques. The treatments discussed have much 
in common with disciplinary techniques. They individualise, they are graduated, they allow 
individuals to be known, assessed and judged, they involve dividing time in well-defined 
ways, they employ the use of tasks and routine, and so on. Accordingly, the IAPT 
programme can now be considered from an alternative perspective. Instead of being the 
consequence of political motives, malign or not, IAPT can be viewed as a contemporary 
incarnation of discipline and so an important part of the social body. It aligns with political 
aims, operates on individuals in sophisticated ways and, in the process, produces or, 
recalling Hacking, makes up a particular type of person. Like antidepressants discussed 
earlier, the IAPT programme is involved in making up depression. Mental health 
professionals actively shape the clinical features of depression, and “psychotherapists no 
less than the pharmaceutical industry coach both their colleagues and the potentially 
treatable population as to the currently most appropriate clinical presentations” (Healy, 
1997, p. 212). 
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But, there are also points of divergence between these treatments and Foucault’s 
techniques. For example, the treatments provide greater autonomy for individuals 
(however, this is something which Foucault’s later elaboration of power certainly provided 
for – see below), they use space in a more flexible and less constrained manner, there are 
no final examinations but ongoing monitoring and self-assessment, they attend more to the 
thoughts of individuals, and there is nothing tangible being immediately extracted from 
individuals, although IAPT certainly benefits from this process. So IAPT is not wholly 
reducible to disciplinary techniques.  
While Foucault’s disciplinary techniques do not perfectly correlate with these 
treatments of depression, elements of the techniques do permeate the treatments discussed. 
What does this mean? Foucault was discussing the emergence of discipline as the system 
of rule shifted from the era of monarchy to the era of the social body, which roughly 
coincided with the Enlightenment. That was a long time ago, but, clearly, traces of 
discipline are to be found in contemporary practices. Does this reflect the historical 
accuracy of Foucault’s descriptions? If our society has grown out of these practices, is it 
therefore to be expected that discipline infiltrates numerous aspects of modern life? 
Perhaps. But, also, it could be the case that Foucault was describing something important 
that, then, as now, partially captured the reality of life, but not wholly. 
From this perspective, we can retain and move away from Foucault’s ideas 
simultaneously. One area where this needs to be done is in the role of, what we call today, 
individual psychology. Foucault was reluctant to draw upon psychological description in 
his analyses to avoid being anachronistic and to avoid developing an ahistorical model of 
human psychology. However, a lack of any kind of individual psychology leaves an 
important aspect of disciplinary techniques unexplained. How do individuals “assume 
responsibility for the constraints of power” (p. 202), or introject power relations without 
some form of psychology? If that were possible, then would those individuals not already 
be docile? 
Judith Butler (1997) is one of many who have probed this issue. She states that, in 
trying to dismiss the possibility of a body being produced outside any power-relations, 
Foucault’s explanations sometimes “require a body to maintain a materiality ontologically 
distinct from the power relations that take it as a site of investment” (pp. 89-90). She goes 
on; “perhaps Foucault himself has invested the body with a psychic meaning that he cannot 
elaborate within the terms that he uses” (p. 95). For her, there is a psychic excess, which 
can lead to resistance, not adequately accounted for by Foucault.    
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Nikolas Rose, whose work is deeply influenced by Foucault (see Rose, 1999 for 
example), has provided an alternative way of thinking about this problem. Drawing upon 
Deleuze, Rose (1996) contends that we can best think of individuals’ inner psychology as a 
“discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority” and not a psychological system 
(p. 37). He uses this concept of the fold to suggest a way of thinking of “an internality 
being brought into existence in the human being without postulating any prior interiority”, 
and these folds “incorporate without totalizing, internalize without unifying” (p. 37). This 
process allows a variety of responses to the experienced exteriority and so can account for 
resistance and agency often viewed as lacking in Foucault’s work; no theory of agency is 
necessary, particularly in relation to resistance, as people “live their lives in a constant 
movement across different practices that subjectify them in different ways” (p. 35). 
Hook (2007) reminds us of the importance of attending to this psychic excess, 
infolding of exteriority, or individual psychology; “if there is no significant psychological 
individuality prior to that affected by power, then surely all subjects would react in a 
largely similar way to the implementation of its effects?” (p. 48). His position is that the 
effects of discipline are psychologically complex and so require some sort of psychological 
explanation. He is keen to retain an emphasis on discipline as a way of considering the 
extent to which the psychological falls under the realm of power, but wonders whether 
certain non-humanistic psychological concepts, applied in an exploratory manner, may 
help to fill in some of the blanks left in Foucault’s work. 
 The extent to which these approaches fully resolve the difficulties they raise is a 
matter for debate. But it does seem that this is an area that cannot be sidestepped in the 
way Foucault did. For if we want to accurately capture the effects of discipline and power 
we require some articulation of the interaction between, in this case, patient and therapist 
to fully understand the complexity of this process. What is also important here is that these 
approaches bear similarities with this study in their desire to utilise yet refine Foucault’s 
thought. As evidenced, Foucault’s work has the potential to enrich understandings of the 
treatments of depression through a consideration of the ways in which power is invested in 
these treatments. Yet his work alone is not enough to fully capture the entirety of these 
treatments in their multiplicity and complexity.  
 
Technologies of the self 
It should be noted that this has been an investigation into practices of domination of 
the individual, what Foucault (1982) called “the objectivizing of the subject” (p. 208). In 
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his later work (1978), he moved away from this approach somewhat to study the ways 
people turn themselves into subjects via technologies of the self. These technologies: 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality (1988, p. 18). 
It is through our attachment to technologies of the self, Rose (1996) argues, that “we are 
governed by our active engagement in the search for a form of existence that is at once 
personally fulfilling and beneficial to our families, our communities, and the collective 
well-being of the nation” (p. 78). 
 This shift in Foucault’s (1978) emphasis also led to him elaborating his descriptions 
of power, focusing more on the productive aspects of power: power is “produced from one 
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere” (p. 93). Accordingly, power permeates all aspects of life. It is produced 
through everyday interactions between people and institutions; power is a system of 
relations within society which needs to be continuously performed in order to be 
maintained (Mills, 2003). This refinement of the concept of power brings with it the 
expectation of resistance: “it would not be possible for power relations to exist without 
points of insubordination which, by definition, are means of escape” (Foucault, 1982, p. 
225). There is a “perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal” between power and resistance 
(p. 226).   
Foucault (1988) suggested that practices of domination and technologies of the self 
function simultaneously. Studying contemporary treatments of depression seems to support 
this notion. In fact, some of the main points of divergence between the treatments and 
disciplinary techniques seem to be legitimate examples of technologies of the self: the 
greater autonomy given to subjects, self-observation, and subjects taking responsibility for 
their own treatment. Perhaps, then, technologies of the self and the productive aspects of 
power play an important, complementary role with disciplinary techniques in the 
governing of the modern individual. But even with this new emphasis on the government 
of the self, these techniques remain, ultimately, types of domination which potentially limit 
the opportunities to work alongside clinical approaches. As a way of employing the key 
insights of Foucault’s work and yet not being governed by them, I would like to return to 




This study does a number of different things. It looks at different conceptions of 
depression, briefly considers depression’s history, engages with contemporary political 
factors influencing the way depression is treated, explores the current treatments of 
depression, analyses these treatments as disciplinary techniques, and discusses other 
aspects of Foucault’s work. In short, it looks at depression from a variety of angles, 
precisely because depression has a variety of sides to it. That is, depression should best be 
thought of as an object of multiplicity. It is, like Mol’s (2002) atherosclerosis described 
above, singular and multiple at the same time. This is what allows these numerous aspects 
of depression to be discussed yet somehow for them to remain cohesive. Even the DSM’s 
depression is multiple yet typically understood, clinically and socially, as singular.  
Mol describes how objects are enacted in practice. This enables a move away from 
describing the construction of objects, which can often lead to a focus purely on discourse. 
“Talking about the enactment of objects builds on and is a shift away from another way of 
talking about objects, one in which the term construction has a prominent place” (p. 41). 
This allows objects to be viewed as having complex identities which differ across time and 
place. But also, objects, like depression, are real because they are part of a practice, a 
reality enacted. From this view, depression does not have a natural essence, but is enacted 
in a multiplicity of practices. It is a few of these practices that I have considered here.
17
 The 
objects and materiality of these practices are just as important as the people involved. In 
Mol’s case, this meant that the microscope is an indispensable part of the multiplicity of 
atherosclerosis. With depression, this might mean that the actual practice of therapy is an 
indispensable part of the multiplicity of depression.  
Multiplicity also prioritises the local rather than the universal. Whatever an object 
is, it is something that is situated in a variety of practices specific to a time and place. So, 
although Mol does not specifically attend to the historical development of atherosclerosis 
and can be critiqued for overlooking this, multiplicity requires a historical and material 
approach to understanding objects. As we have seen in the case of depression, historical 
engagement is absolutely vital for an in-depth understanding of such objects. Without this, 
we would not have seen the extent to which contemporary depression has been made up by 
Kraepelin’s ideas, psychoanalysis, antidepressants, and more recently CBT; and that these 
                                                          
17
Although I have done this is in the abstract through analysing texts rather than actual clinical practice. It seems 
plausible to expect that the multiple aspects of depression seen in this study would multiply further in clinical practice.  
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historical factors were part of wider social changes which only retrospectively appear 
inevitable. Historical reflections also demonstrated the gender and race specificity of 
depression, both significant aspects of depression’s past. Multiplicity also encourages a 
consideration of the different fields – psychology, psychiatry, patient etc – which have 
interacted with depression.
18
 Finally, it places issues of power and politics on an equal 
footing with clinical issues and research in the enactment of depression and can therefore 
retain in a constructive way the insights of Foucault’s work. 
I have tried to add to the multiplicity of depression by considering these treatments 
as disciplinary techniques. This encourages reflection on the importance of issues of power 
and politics in the area of mental health, but attempts to do so in a way that is not 
insensitive to the range of social and clinical practices trying to provide support for 
distressed individuals. I have attempted to broaden discussions of depression and its 




Depression is a psychiatric object that is conceptualised in a variety of ways from a 
variety of theoretical perspectives. It has a complicated and nuanced history which 
illustrates the extent to which depression is a fragile object that has not always been with 
us and is subject to change. It is nonetheless an important topical issue, in the political 
arena as well as the clinical one. This study has used the work of Michel Foucault to 
attempt to add another angle to thinking about today’s treatment of depression. This was 
done by analysing four contemporary treatments of depression as disciplinary techniques. 
These were computerised cognitive behavioural therapy, guided self-help, cognitive 
behavioural therapy and behavioural activation.  
The analysis carried out here has shown that these treatments share many features 
of, and so can be considered, disciplinary techniques. This raises the importance of 
thinking about issues of politics and power when thinking about psychiatric and 
psychological treatment. It would be naïve and potentially harmful to view these 
                                                          
18
I have also spent very little time considering depression from the perspective of the patient which would be a 
different project entirely. In overlooking this, I hope not to have given the impression that patients are merely obedient subjects, 
and Hacking’s framework and Foucault’s technologies of the self and productive aspects of power are sophisticated ways of 
reflecting upon the influence patients have in the enactment of depression and its treatment. 
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treatments as purely based upon developing scientific and clinical knowledge; they are 
intimately bound up with wider social and political issues. This needs to be accounted for 
in both clinical and socio-political reflections upon depression.  
This analysis has also interrogated Foucault’s disciplinary techniques themselves 
and shown that there are some limitations to using them as analytical tools. They are 
extremely important in showing the extent to which power relations are dispersed 
throughout society, but they lack the sensitivity to capture the entirety of modern day 
treatments. Combined with technologies of the self and the productive aspects of power, 
disciplinary techniques are more fully equipped for this task. Nevertheless, this results, 
ultimately, in viewing the practices of the human sciences as ones of domination. This is 
unsatisfactory, however, when attempting to engage with and improve clinical practice. 
Multiplicity offers a solution. 
Today’s treatments of depression are disciplinary techniques, but they are also 
more than this. They are multiple. They are the routine practices that take place between 
GP and patient, therapist and client, self and computer. They are inextricably interlinked 
with political and economic interests but they are also about enabling a person to get out of 
bed in the morning. Approaching treatments from a view of multiplicity allows these 
different aspects to be viewed with equal importance in the enactment of contemporary 
depression. This has the potential to retain the original and important insights of Foucault’s 
work while also stressing the multifaceted, everyday practices involving depression. This 
should enable a broader and narrower view of depression that could go a long way towards 
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